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FAMILY, CHURCH AND STATE: AN ESSAY ON
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND RELIGIOUS
AUTHORITY
By Carol Weisbrod*
I. INTRODUCTION
The following essay attempts a formal pluralist analysis of rela-
tions between church and state in the United States and suggests that
such an analysis is useful in describing the role of religious and other
non-state authority in the American context. The specific focus is on
church-state interactions in relation to the family, and illustrative ma-
terial is taken from the history of American family law. Part I of the
paper is a statement of the general perspective and of two analytical
models used in the discussion. Part II offers several applications of
these two models as, in effect, short historical case studies. These case
studies concern the nineteenth century debates over polygamy and di-
vorce, and the nineteenth and twentieth century efforts of different reli-
gious groups to regulate child placement and adoption. The stress in
Part II is on the role of rights claims by religious groups in the state
system. The essay concludes in Part III with a brief discussion of con-
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stitutionalism and legal pluralism.' The paper is descriptive and at-
tempts to provide a perspective and vocabulary. It does not address
normative questions relating to the appropriateness or desirability of a
particular response of either state or religious law to the issues dis-
cussed.' Nor does it suggest that there are specific consequences which
must necessarily follow in the state system from the application of the
labels used here.
II. OVERVIEW
Some initial observations on usage may be helpful. The term "sov-
ereign" is ordinarily used in relation to nation states. It usually de-
scribes the single source of ultimate political authority, and the source
of law. The typical assumption is that within a state there is only one
sovereign. That view is challenged by another, often called "English"
1 The present paper uses a "strong" version of pluralism recently described in Griffiths, What
is Legal Pluralism?, 24 J. OF LEGAL PLURALISM 1 (1986). On pluralism, see also Galanter, Jus-
tice in Many Rooms: Courts, Private Ordering and Indigenous Law, 19 J. OF LEGAL PLURALISM I
(1981); Engel, Legal Pluralism in an American Community: Perspectives on a Civil Trial Court,
1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 425 (1980).
For a discussion of constitutionalism derived from legal realist and pluralist ideas, see § IV.
For another view, see Kay, Pre-Constitutional Rules, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 187 (1981).
" It should be noted that the idea "church" and the idea "state" are both problematic in the
American context because of the diversity and complexity of both structures. See, e.g., Smith,
Relations Between Church and State in the United States, 35 AM. J. COMP. L. 1 (1987).
Normative positions from a pluralist perspective are possible. Howe, The Supreme Court,
1952 Term-Foreword: Political Theory and the Nature of Liberty, 67 HARv. L. REV. 91
(1953)(commenting on Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952), and suggesting
that Maitland and Figgis would have approved of the decision). Id. at 92-93. Howe's discussion
includes, as a normative proposition, the idea that it would be good if the state accommodated
internal groups to the point appropriate (who decides this?) to their sovereign capacity. This for-
mulation, perhaps, is too focused on, or addressed to, the state for the purposes of a legal pluralist
analysis. The normative propositions of legal or political pluralism would seem to be that decen-
tralization is in general a good thing, and that groups should recognize each other as sovereign.
The question may be analogized in the state system to problems of conflict of laws. This is
indeed how the question is sometimes discussed by those treating similar questions in other coun-
tries. See, e.g., A. ALLOT, ESSAYS ON AFRICAN LAW (1970). See also B. TER HAAR, ADAT LAW
IN INDONESIA (1948)(with introductory essays by A. Hoebel and A. Schiller); Anderson, Colonial
Law in Tropical Africa: The Conflict between English, Islamic and Customary Law, 35 IND. L.J.
433 (1960); Note, Religious Exemptions Under the Free Excercise Clause: A Model of Compet-
ing Authorities, 90 YALE L.J. 350 (1980).
The State is often said to have the "legitimate" monopoly on force, and this is often assumed
to be entirely adequate to all cases. But, of course, one can also consider limits on the enforcement
power of the state. The existence of polygamous marriage among fundamentalist Mormons more
than one hundred years after Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878), which upheld a
bigamy statute, is enough to raise this question. See also The Indian Attempt to Eliminate Sut-
tee, N.Y. Times, Sept. 19, 1987, at 1, col. 2.
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or "political" or "legal" pluralism, which asserts that it is arbitrary to
confine the term "sovereignty" to aspects of the state and which argues
that "sovereignty" can be located in groups other than the state. This
meaning of the word "pluralism" (adopted here) must be distinguished
from the idea of "cultural pluralism," which assumes the fact or desira-
bility of cultural or social diversity within a single sovereign state, or
the idea of interest group "pluralism," which focuses on the competi-
tion among inner associations and groups for favor from the central
state.
Related to this usage of the term "pluralism"' is a broad definition
of law. We are accustomed to seeing law as "official," emanating from
one source only, although that source may itself, as in a federated
state, have various "official" levels within it, federal, state, and local.
We are, in short, accustomed to a sharp distinction between "law" and
"not law." This is true even though we may concede that not law may
be "like" law in its formal aspects, and may concede also that "law"
can accommodate particular elements of "not law." An alternative to
this view is offered by those who see effective regulation emanating
from any source as "law," though it may still be useful to label the
source of law for descriptive purposes, as in "state law" or "church
law," where the context fails to make the source clear.
This perspective, which rests on the idea of plural authorities and
sources of law, is not only not new, it is quite old. Intellectual anteced-
As F. M. Barnard and R. A. Vernon noted:
In what is most commonly thought of as 'pluralism' today-that is, a more or less
cohesive set of doctrines drawn from the 'interest-group' and 'mass-society' litera-
ture-intermediate groups are presented as instruments for bringing particularist pres-
sures to bear, positively or negatively, in the shaping of public policy. This model of
indirect participation has been vigorously challenged, in the last decade or so, by theo-
rists of direct participation. In the (direct) 'participationist' model, groups are valued
not as instruments of external pressure but as arenas for internal individual participa-
tion on the attainment of common ends.
Barnard & Vernon, Pluralism Participation and Politics: Reflection on the Intermediate Group,
3 POL. THEORY 180 (1975). "In denying that the state is a distinctive and unique form of associa-
tion, the participationists echo the thought of the English pluralists, notably Harold Laski and
G.D.H. Cole, for whom this denial was a fundamental credo." Id. at 182 (emphasis in original).
See also D. NICHOLLS, THREE VARIETIES OF PLURALISM (1979).
For anthropological perspectives on pluralism, see S.F. MOORE, LAW As PROCESS: AN AN-
THROPOLOGICAL APPROACH (1978). The group is "semi-autonomous" in that "it can generate
rules and customs and symbols internally" but is at the same time "vulnerable to rules and deci-
sions and other forces emanating from the larger world by which it is surrounded." Id. at 55. See
also, Macaulay, Private Government in L. LIPSON & S. WHEELER, LAW AND THE SOCIAL SCI-
ENCES 445 (1986).
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ents can be found in the writing of English pluralists" and American
interest group theorists." Structural antecedents can be found in
church-state arrangements in other countries over many centuries.' A
similar perspective is found in the work of legal anthropologists and
lawyers interested in law and social science. The view offered here is
also related in some ways to that of social historians who urge that one
should look at outsiders as well as insiders, and consider the margin
and the periphery as well as the core.' The present framework perhaps
" See, e.g., G. COLE, SOCIAL THEORY (1920); J. FIGGIS, CHURCHES IN THE MODERN STATE
(1913).
See, e.g., R. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1956).
' For example, the "millet" system of the Ottoman Empire permitted non-Muslim minorities
a degree of judicial authority. See Rubenstein, Law and Religion in Israel, 2 ISRAEL L. REV. 384
(1967). The system also existed in the West. Thus, although the ecclesiastical courts in England
regulated marriage and divorce until 1857, it is not altogether true that this was the only law of
divorce in England since Jewish divorces were at times given within the Jewish community. See J.
Bryce's essay titled Marriage and Divorce in Roman and in English Law, in 2 STUDIES IN HIS-
TORY AND JURISPRUDENCE 437 (1901)(suggesting that the Jewish community operated under its
own personal law). On France, see A. HERTZBERG. THE FRENCH ENLIGHTENMENT AND THE JEws
207 (1968). (On Jewish divorce, see Perl v. Perl, 126 A.D.2d 91, 512 N.Y.S.2d 372 (1987).)
It may be useful to consider an old, statutory example of the system in America to see some
of its assumptions. In 1798 Rhode Island passed a statute that explicitly exempted Jews from the
operation of the state incest law. An Act Regulating Marriage and Divorce, 1798 R.I. PUB. LAWS
§ 7. The statute provided that marriage within certain prohibited degrees should be null and void,
but these provisions did not apply to marriages among Jews within the degrees permitted by their
religion. The general rule concerning out of state marriages is clear: A marriage valid where
celebrated is valid (recognized) everywhere. But there is, of course, an exception which limits
recognition to marriages that do not offend some strongly held public policy. The Rhode Island
statute suggests that even as to incest there may have been a certain flexibility. This statute seems
to indicate that, at least on the question of incest and uncle-niece marriages, the religious liberty
idea was dominant. The Rhode Island statute assumes, without discussion, that there is a group
called the Jews and that we know what the group is. Without detailed treatment of the question
here, it should be clear that to us the question is, at the very least, problematic.
The question can come up directly in the context of adoption under religious matching stat-
utes, discussed infra § III B. On Rhode Island's answer in the context of Sabbatarian exemptions
to Sunday law, see R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-40-4 (1956).
See generally Hartogensis, Rhode Island and Consanguineous Jewish Marriages, 20 PUBLI-
CATIONS OF THE AM. JEWISH HIST. SOC'Y 137 (1911). A number of states accord special status to
Jews, Quakers, and other religious groups in connection with requirements for solemnization. The
Rhode Island incest statute is striking in that it goes far beyond the issue of the ceremony. See B.
MEISLIN, JEWISH LAW IN AMERICAN TRIBUNALS 65 (1976). See generally Elazer & Goldstein,
The Legal Status of the American Jewish Community, 1972 AM. JEWISH YEAR BOOK 3.
From the point of view of the state, these are instances of state legal system providing for a
limited role for recognized group law. But what does this look like from the point of view of the
group, particularly when the group is "multinational," internal and external to many states?
Plural legal systems may also result from class differences. Thus, wife sale might be seen as
an English "law" of divorce (see E. THOMPSON, THE MAKING OF THE ENGLISH WORKING CLASS
410 n.3 (1964)), a law officially "illegal" under the state system.
7 See generally Moore, Insiders and Outsiders in American Historical Narrative and Ameri-
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goes a step further in suggesting that the outsider may, from another
perspective, be an insider and that the margin may, from another point
of view, be a center. These alternate centers can be seen by an outside
observer as sources of authority in the same way that the state is a
source of authority. The social world is described rather as English plu-
ralists or legal pluralists describe it, as filled with competing sovereign-
ties and sources of law.
Finally, the paper uses the term "constitution" in a particular way.
We are familiar with the idea that the term may mean "text," or "text
plus interpretations of the Supreme Court," or "Bill of Rights," or
even, somehow, [state] "law." The word "constitution" can also be
used to mean the way things are and operate,' and this usage is the one
invoked here. This constitution is seen as the framework of the interac-
tion of groups. Thus, we can say that issues of church and state are
undoubtedly "constitutional," in the sense that there is something in
the American constitutional document that addresses specifically the
subject of religion and the state.' The issues are also constitutional,
however, in that the topic "church and state" must be treated as part
of our society's "constitution," or fundamental framework.
The central point of this paper is that religious groups may view
themselves as a source of authority at least equal to the state,10 and
that they may see issues of the church and state as questions involving
competing systems of law11 or sovereignties. A Catholic discussion in
can History, 87 AM. HIST. REV. 390 (1982); R. MOORE, INSIDERS AND OUTSIDERS IN AMERICAN
HISTORY (1986).
8 Arthur Bentley had said that "the Constitution is always what is." A. BENTLEY, THE PRO-
CESS OF GOVERNMENT 296 (1908). Llewellyn referred to his article on the Constitution (Llewel-
lyn, The Constitution as an Institution 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1934)) as "A Rediscovery of
Bentley."
" The Federal Constitution provides that "congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof," U.S. CONST. amend. 1, and that "no
religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any office or public trust ... ." Id. at art.
VI, cl. 3.
10 A subsidiary theme relates to the role of rights claims in the interaction of religious groups
and the state.
" The idea of multiple legal systems is recognized in various places. P. RYAN & D. GRAN-
FIELD, DOMESTIC RELATIONS: CIVIL AND CANON LAW (1963). "Since this code of positive law,
though ecclesiastical, affects some forty-three million American Catholics and, indirectly, many
million non-Catholics who have married Catholics, it is justifiably treated in a casebook on Anglo-
American law." Id. at xi. See also Parkinson v. J & S Tool Co., 64 N.J. 159, 313 A.2d 609
(1974).
G. BAYLES, WOMAN AND THE LAW (1901) included a chapter on the plural marriage of the
Mormons and on Mormon divorce, noting that "while polygamy is dying out as a social institu-
1987-881
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1959 on the issue of sovereignty in the context of the regulation of the
family summarizes the history of the matter this way:
At first the Christian law of marriage could do no more than co-exist with
that of the Pagan Roman State, but gradually, as the West was evangelized,
the legislative and judicial competence of the Church in this field was ac-
knowledged, at first in practice and then in principle, until, by the tenth cen-
tury, she was in exclusive control .... Of the conflicting modern claimants to
sovereignty in this field, therefore, it is the State rather than the Church that
is the newcomer."
The image of competing and parallel sovereignties is given solidity
by recognition of the fact that churches, as well as states, attempt to
regulate the lives of their citizens/members in many respects."i Both
church and state tax members and have things to say on issues ranging
from family life to economics to foreign affairs. They both run legal
systems, and both of these legal systems use serious sanctions." The
tion, it cannot be said to be extinct, and plural marriages are still legal factors in the lives of a
number of women." Id. at 24. It is unnecessary to cite here material on religious legal systems.
For an example of the formalism in some of these, see S. FORD, THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM
(1970). One should note in relation to religious legal systems that the same distinctions between
the living law, the law in action and the law in the books that can be made in relation to the state
system, can also be made here. ("Living Law"-the law of internal associations-is to be distin-
guished from state law-in-action. See E. EHRLICH. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCIOLOGY
OF LAW (Moll trans. 1962).) Of course, "rights" can also be claimed under the religious system.
See Folmer, Promoting and Protecting Rights in the Church 46 THE JURIST 1 (1986).
" McReavy, The Power of the Church in CATHOLICS AND DIVORCE 76 (P. O'Mahoney ed.
1959).
I3 For present purposes it is useful to view all religious groups as if they saw themselves the
way the Devil Screwtape sees the Christian Church as "spread out through all time and space and
rooted in Eternity, terrible as an army with banners." C.S. LEWIS, THE SCREWTAPE LETTERS 12
(1967). To pursue this objective, I have taken statements from various denominations over a large
period of time and made those statements stand for a generalized religious view. Religious groups
differ greatly from each other, even when they stand within the same broad religious tradition.
Thus, Christian denominations take different positions on questions ranging from particular sub-
stantive issues to the general and pervasive questions of the role of the state in enforcing those
substantive positions. Further, these orientations may, in fact, change over time (perhaps because
of the influence of the state), a point that may be de-emphasized by the religious group by a stress
on continuity. Any particular group may, in its history, emphasize different combinations of the
co-option or separatist modes, and may switch from one to another in general or on a particular
issue. Thus, one might say that Protestant churches in America started from a position stressing
co-option of the state and moved, following disestablishment, to a position stressing the moral
authority of the churches, at least over their own members, and then attempted (see prohibition,
particularly) to reassert authority universally through state regulation. The effort here is not to
provide a narrative history of any particular group's encounters with the state in terms of these
modes, but simply to describe these modes in general.
" The detailed ways in which church and state concern themselves with the subject of mar-
riage are not, however, mirror images, and their sanctions are not identical. "The Church and the
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problem for a pluralist analysis, then, is to explore points at which the
two self-defined sovereignties touch each other and to consider the ways
in which they have interacted over time. This essay uses the history of
family law in America as a way of reaching this question. 15 The piece
suggests a view of the family as an entity that is subject to the overlap-
ping authority of two legal orders, one described as secular and at least
theoretically integrated, and the other described as religious and con-
taining many individual subsystems. Two stylized models of church-
state interaction are used. In the first (Mode I), the particular church
tries to "co-opt" the state and persuade it to adopt and impose a reli-
gious norm as universal. In the second (Mode II) the group's particu-
larism itself is defended. In this "separatist" interaction, the effort of
the religious group is simply to preserve singularity and create space
for its alternative.16
State are two organizations founded upon different principles," Dr. Hugh Davey Evans wrote in
1870, although both, as he saw it, had "divinely given authority." The Church and State, he said,
might each have jurisdiction over all actions "when circumstances bring them within its sphere."
The spheres relate, according to Evans, to the essential purposes of each: The one for the "eternal,
the other for the temporal benefit of mankind." H. EVANS, A TREATISE ON THE CHRISTIAN Doc-
TRINE OF MARRIAGE 24, 25 (1870).
Expulsion is a primary group sanction. There are other church sanctions, for example, repri-
mand and suspension, that may also operate. In Adams, Some Phases of Sexual Morality and
Church Discipline in Colonial New England, MAss. HIST. Soc'Y PROCEEDINGS, MASS. HIST.
SOC'Y PAPERS 493-94 (June 1891), the author suggested that the threat of withholding baptism
from infants in a community which believed in infant damnation operated as a sanction to coerce
married adults, guilty of premarital intercourse which resulted in the birth of a child, into
confession.
"Shunning" is a religious sanction that may also be a tort under state law. When a former
member (what is the test of this?) sues the group, a defense to that tort may be asserted based on
the first amendment free exercise clause. The group is looking for a state-recognized exemption
for its own sanction (Mode I used to protect Mode 11 (see infra note 16 and accompanying text))
from the generally applicable law of torts. For shunning and the free exercise clause, see Bear v.
Reformed Mennonite, 462 Pa. 330, 341 A.2d 105 (1975); Paul v. Watchtower Bible and Tract
Soc'y of New York, 108 S. Ct. 289 (1987). See also the custody case, Johnson v. Johnson, 564
P.2d 71, 73 (Alaska 1977), in which an expelled Jehovah's Witness argued that "if he were denied
custody of the children, he would have virtually no input into their lives because of his disfellow-
shipped status." The court believed that "liberal and specific visitation rights" would provide an
adequate solution to this difficulty. Id.
15 For an overview of the historical changes in American Family Law, see M. GROSSBERG.
GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA (1985).
The family can, of course, also be viewed as an internal group, regulating individuals. The view
taken here is of the family as a unit regulated by other groups.
" This two part distinction parallels other familiar distinctions, for example between univer-
sal and particular (see R. MACIVER, ON COMMUNITY. SOCIETY AND POWER 78 (1970), where the
author states (as to some religious groups) that "They would make universal, by coercion, their
own moral particularism"); between church and sect as offered by Troeltsch (The church accepts
the secular rule to some degree and "desires to cover the whole of humanity" where as the sects
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The basic themes of the American interaction between these
groups as they affect the family are the joint regulation of marriage
and family by church and state, and the attempt of religious groups to
influence state law as it relates to the family. The history of American
family law reveals and has always revealed the two patterns called here
Mode I (co-option) and Mode II (separatist).17 Both involve a religious
influence on and use of the state legal system. 8 Both, when the group
is successful,19 result in an increased harmony 0 between the two sys-
tems. When the religious group attempts to have its norm incorporated
have "no desire to control and incorporate [other] forms of social life" but try to avoid them. E.
TROELTSCH, THE SOCIAL TEACHINGS OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCHES I 331ff (English trans.
1931)); and finally, between the two parts of the religion clauses of the first amendment. (The
establishment clause focuses on Mode I problems, the free exercise clause on Mode II issues.)
17 These two religious approaches to the enforcement role of the state have a history of their
own. See P. BROWN, AUGUSTINE OF HiPpo (1967)(describing a similar distinction in treating
Augustine's controversy with the Donatists-a view of society as something that can be absorbed
by the church as against a view of the Church that must be seen as an alternative to state/
society).
"8 The interactions described here are also familiar in general. Thus, Earl Latham remarked
in 1952 that "self-expression and security are sought by the group member through control of the
physical and social environment which surrounds each group and in the midst of which it dwells."
Latham, The Group Basis of Politics: Notes for a Theory 46 AM. POL. ScI. REv. 386 (1952). See
also MACIVER, supra note 16.
19 How does a religious group measure "success," by result or reason? This itself becomes a
question for historical or contextual discussion.
20 Sometimes a practical, harmonious solution is not reached. The state may refuse either to
be co-opted or to permit the deviation, and the religious group may resist. The Russian Old Be-
lievers chose martyrdom by fire rather than submission to the power of the Tsar. Carrying the
struggle to the spiritual realm, the state responded with a law that "tried to prove that self-willed
martyrdom, a result of criminal and traitorous acts, was not true martyrdom and could not bring
glory and salvation." Cherniavsky, The Old Believers and the New Religion, 25 SLAVIC REV. 18,
24 (1966).
More typically, where a state accommodation is not made, the group yields to superior force,
although it may still underline the insistence of the group on its own ultimate authority. Thus, the
1890 Mormon declaration of submission to federal authority, after noting that the practice had
been "established as a result of direct revelation" and describing the Mormon experience in the
courts, said that the church discontinued its practice, "solemnly placing the responsibility for the
change upon the nation by whose laws the renunciation had been forced." Quoted in L. PFEFFER,
CHURCH, STATE AND FREEDOM 649 (1953).
See L. ARRINGTON & D. BITTON, THE MORMAN EXPERIENCE: A HISTORY OF THE LATTER-
DAY SAINTS 183-84 (1979). "Some local and national leaders found [the] statement incomplete.
They would have preferred a renunciation of the principle of plurality, not just a resolution to
abide by the law." Id. See also NELSON, CHARTER OF LIBERTY 97-98 (1987).
The Oneida Perfectionists gave up complex marriage "not as renouncing belief in the princi-
ples and prospective finality of that institution" but rather "in deference to the public sentiment
which is evidently rising against it." AM. SOCIALIST, Aug. 28, 1879 at 276 (quoted in Weisbrod &
Sheingorn, Reynolds v. United States:-Nineteenth-Century Forms of Marriage and the Status
of Women, 10 CONN. L. REV. 849 n. 114 (1978)).
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directly into the larger legal structure as a universal norm, (Mode I)
the case can be described (depending on historical conclusions) as one
in which the church co-opts, persuades or influences the state, or alter-
natively, as a case in which state and religious norms happen to be,
independently, identical. The separatist (Mode II) pattern-one in
which the religious group has the more limited goal of creating space
for its rule, without attempting to enforce it generally-can be de-
scribed as a case of the state accommodating the internal religious
group, though also setting the limits within which it operates, or, alter-
natively, as a case in which the state defers to and acknowl-
edges-without creating-another source of authority."' The attempt
here is not to discuss the history or etiology of particular religious posi-
tions, which obviously may change over time,2" but rather to look at
two strategies used by churches in relating to the state.
Looking at these strategies as alternative and distinct, one might
suspect that the first, involving co-option of the state and a state adop-
tion of religious norms, would be the strategy of large and influential
religious groups-Protestants, for example-while the second, involving
the preservation of singularity, might be used by minority or even mar-
ginal religious groups. This is not quite the factual pattern, however.
The interaction between religious groups and the modern state,23 in
" The two strategies described here are similar to the political stances associated with reli-
gious groups whose tendencies are described (by historians, though not necessarily by theolo-
gians), as dominantly "liturgical" or "pietist." See R. JENSEN, THE WINNING OF THE MIDWEST:
SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 1888-1896 (1971); P. KLEPPNER, THE CROSS OF CULTURE: A
SOCIAL ANALYSIS OF MIDWESTERN POLITICS, 1850-1900 (1970); D. THELEN, PATHS OF RESIS-
TANCE (1986). In their attitudes toward state involvement in moral issues, "liturgicals" are said to
favor pluralism, and state abstention. Moral issues are to be left to the churches. By contrast, in
groups dominated by "pietist" thinking (some groups involve both styles or an indeterminate
style) the effort is to achieve a major state enforcement role. Using this terminology, one might
suggest that in relation to issues of the family, and particularly the question of liberal divorce
laws, groups that might be seen as "liturgical" as evidenced by their position on temperance-for
example, Catholics-will be seen as "pietist," as evidenced by their position on divorce. See also
the statements from a variety of religious groups in Calhoun's chapter, The Attitude of the
Church in 3 A. CALHOUN, A SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN FAMILY (1919).
The state has values of its own. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
(Note, however, the exemptions for spiritual healing in state neglect statutes.) It also reserves
certain functions. Consider the problem of capital punishment as a religious sanction. "[I]t may
very well be conceded that if the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church should undertake
to try one of its members for murder, and punish him with death or imprisonment, its sentence
would be of no validity in a civil court or anywhere else." Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.)
679, 733 (1871).
" This would require studies of individual denominational histories.
z' This is a result of the pervasive claims of the modern state. It may be that in the nine-
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fact, tends to involve a combination of the two styles. The strict ana-
lytic categories suggested by the terms Mode I and Mode II immedi-
ately dissolve when we see first that the attainment of even a limited
separatist objective (Mode II) tends now to require the collaboration of
the state, which must recognize the objective as legitimate (Mode I),4
and second, that the church's desire to co-opt the state (Mode I) may
have as one of its prime sources the desire of that church to safeguard
its own values (Mode II).25
These points are illustrated in the short historical case studies that
follow.
III. ILLUSTRATIONS
Let us take as the beginning of an American state law of the fam-
ily the experience of the religiously-based New England colonies.2 ' We
teenth century, a group might have operated in a separatist (Mode 11) fashion without coming up
against the state at all. Even the nineteenth century utopias, however, had their legal encounters.
See C. WEISBROD, THE BOUNDARIES OF UTOPIA (1980). Noninteraction would be much less likely
today, at least for any length of time. Further, one might raise the question whether this separatist
noninteracting group was not actually itself "sovereign" so that perhaps one would think of this as
a Mode I case. These distinctions are suggested not as watertight analytic models, but as a way of
talking about things that are, broadly speaking, different in the way that the effort of religious
groups to bar abortion is different from the effort of religious groups to keep their own children
out of public schools.
" Another way to say this is that the Mode I strategy can operate at two levels. In one, the
religious group co-opts the state in a way that achieves general enforcement of a religious value
(i.e., everyone says prayers in the schools). At another level, Mode I operates so as to validate, as
a general matter of state law, a religious group's particular value as applied within the group. This
validation may involve an exemption from some state norm (see. e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205 (1972)) or it may take the form of a state norm broad enough to give the religious
group, among others, room for self-regulation. (Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).)
In this light, the flag salute cases involving the Jehovah's Witnesses (West Virginia v. Bar-
nette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Minersville v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940)) appear as cases in which
the goal of the religious group can be labelled Mode II, with Mode I used in order to protect the
group. State recognition of the complexity of Mode I/Mode II interfaces can be seen in the ques-
tion (raised in the vocabulary of state constitutional law) of whether the state's accommodation of
a religious group or value through the free exercise clause violates the establishment clause.
26 See T. WOOLSEY, infra note 51.
26 See Flaherty, Law and the Enforcement of Morals in LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 209,
211 (Bailyn & Fleming eds. 1984). "The universal acceptance of Christianity in the American
colonies inevitably made for a close association between church and state, but the accompanying
harmoniousness of moral outlook made an official interlocking unnecessary.... The enforcement
of the moral law became one of the primary obligations of colonial governments."
It may be in this world, dominated by Mode I in the sense of a direct universal application of
religious norms, that one sees the Two Swords issue as it might have been understood, historically,
in Europe. That is, church/state problems would be conflicts between two sets of officials in a
single (Christian) society. (See J. FIGGIS. CHURCHES IN THE MODERN STATE (1913).)
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notice in the seventeenth century not only an extensive involvement of
the government with issues of the family, but also a high degree of
direct involvement of government in other aspects of the private lives of
individuals. This involvement went beyond setting out, through the
criminal law, the boundaries of proper behavior and beyond establish-
ing the limits of private contracting. The Puritans, Edmund Morgan
wrote, "not only endeavored themselves to live a 'smooth, honest, civil
life' but tried to force everyone within their power to do likewise."",
Morgan notes, for example, that since for the Puritans, "marriage was
an ordinance of God, and its duties commands of God, the Puritan
courts enforced these duties not simply at the request of the injured
party but on their own paternal initiative."" When we see as an aspect
of life in Colonial New England the assumed power of government to
direct that individuals must live in families," as illustrated by the stat-
utes against solitary living, we seem to be looking at a different under-
standing of the role of government in relation to private life from the
contemporary understanding reflected in our modern "privacy" cases."s
The early experience is, one might say, Mode I at its strongest in
America. But perhaps this older understanding was not so different
from what we see as the relation between religion, government, and the
family through the late nineteenth century.
This observation may initially seem implausible on the theory that
the New England colonies were theocratic while late nineteenth cen-
27 E. MORGAN, THE PURITAN FAMILY: RELIGION AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN SEVEN-
TEENTH CENTURY NEW ENGLAND 2 (1944). John Demos, in A LITTLE COMMONWEALTH: FAMILY
LIFE IN PLYMOUTH COLONY 8 (1970) notes, after describing the governmental structure, that
"equally central to the life of the local community was, of course, the church." The theme of
control is, then, expressed through different agencies working together. Id. at 9. On religion, see
particularly id. at 12-13. "Church and State were formally separate, but in practice they were
everywhere intertwined."
I d. at 39.
" That is, as Morgan suggests, in the seventeenth century one could choose the particular
regime of family government to which one would be subject, but then one had to be subject to
some regime. See Michael Grossberg's discussion of the seventeenth century family: "Fittingly,
the community not only had a deep and abiding interest in family life, but armed its agents with
extensive powers to prevent homes from becoming disorderly or ineffective ...." M. GROSSDERG,
GOVERNING AND HEARTH, LAW AND FAMILY IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 4 (1985).
Puritan New England is taken here as the beginning of the story. Historians might want to
examine family law in other English colonies, or, like Ahistrom, look to Spanish settlements as the
beginning of an American story (see S. AHLSTROM, A RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
PEOPLE (1972)).
SO See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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tury America had already experienced many decades of disestablish-
ment. This difference, it might be said, would make such comparisons
almost impossible. But this is to assume that the change in form (dises-
tablishment) involved an immediate, pervasive, and thorough-going
change in substance. It seems, however, that the implications of dises-
tablishment took much longer to be worked out, at least in the area of
family law.
The particular American experience in relation to religion and re-
ligious groups involves, in fact, a central complication. Notwithstanding
an insistence on separation of church and state, to the extent that the
United States identified itself as part of Western Christendom,3' the
state at times conceded a special role for Christianity. As Lawrence
Friedman has suggested, the United States had for a long time a quasi-
official religion. 2 Even the religion clauses of the First Amendment,
Mark De Wolfe Howe argued some time ago, can be read in relation to
the religious ideas of Roger Williams as plausibly as in relation to the
more secular ideas of Madison or Jefferson. as The formal separation of
church and state at the federal level that came with the adoption of the
Bill of Rights did not in any case impact directly on the states until the
twentieth century." In Massachusetts and Connecticut, disestablish-
ment itself did not come for some time. 5 More importantly for present
purposes, over time there was considerable sentiment to the effect that
formal separation of church and state did not mean that the United
States was no longer a "Christian Nation." It seems beyond dispute
that even after the abandonment of official connections between church
and state, there were many who believed that the links between religion
and morals, and more particularly between Christian morals and the
state were as important as ever.
It is widely understood in legal writing on the family that this link
between Christianity and the law was particularly visible in the area of
S It seems safe to say that despite, or within the context of separation of church and state,
the United States remained generally attached through the nineteenth century to a diffuse concep-
tion of itself as a Christian nation. See M. BORDEN, JEWS, TURKS AND INFIDELS (1984). The legal
consequences of that conception are to some degree ambiguous.
," Friedman, Exposed Nerves: Some Thoughts on Our Changing Legal Culture, 7 SUFFOLK
U.L. REV. 529 (1983). See also L. FRIEDMAN. TOTAL JUSTICE (1986).
33 M. HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS: RELIGION AND GOVERNMENT IN AMERI-
CAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY (1965).
34 See Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296 (1940).
"' See Weisbrod, The More Proof The More Doubt, 18 CONN. L. REV. 803 (1986).
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family law. The comments of T.M. Cooley provide a clear nineteenth
century example. Discussing the question whether Christianity was
part of the law of the land, Cooley noted that this was, in a "certain
sense and for certain purposes, true." While there was no attempt to
enforce Christian precepts directly, the "best features of the common
law," and "especially those which regard the family and social rela-
tions," if not derived from religion, "have at least been improved and
strengthened by the prevailing religion and the teachings of its sacred
Book . . . ." The influence of religion on the state law of the family
(Mode I) is symbolized by the fact that ministers were from an early
time permitted to perform marriage ceremonies, even though marriage
was conceived in the seventeenth century as a civil institution having
civil consequences.3 7 Seen in a pluralist context, however, the participa-
tion of ministers in the marriage ceremony takes on additional mean-
ing. It is not merely a symbol of a historic concern of religious groups
with marriage and the family, but also an illustration of the application
by a religious legal system of its own standards (Mode II), imposed
independently, above the standards of the civil authority.38
A. Marriage and Divorce
One linkage between the family, Christianity and the law (from
this paper's perspective, a Mode I interaction, i.e. a successful co-option
of the state by the church) is revealed with particular clarity in the late
nineteenth century controversies over marriage. The Christian form of
monogamous marriage was viewed as the basis of the state. A standard
statement of this position is found in the English case Hyde v. Hyde:
36 2 T. COOLEY, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTION LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLA-
TIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 976 (8th ed. 1927). His examples were
those laws which "compel the parent to support the child; the husband to support the wife; which
make the marriage tie permanent and forbid polygamy." His conclusion was that Christianity was
"not a part of the law of the land in any sense which entitles the courts to take notice of and base
their judgments upon it, except so far as they can find that its precept and principles have been
incorporated in and made a component part of the positive law of the State." Id.
On the formal side, the attempt to adopt Christian Nation Amendments to the Constitution
was not successful.
Church attempts to impose their own norms as universal (Mode 1) goals make possible a
challenge to legislation on establishment clause grounds. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297
(1980)(rejecting establishment clause attack).
" Freund, Uniform Marriage and Divorce Legislation, CASE AND COMMENT 7-8 (June
1914).
8 This was plain to Richmond and Hall, who included in their 1929 study of the administra-
tion of the marriage laws in the United States several sections on religion and marriage, focusing
on the marriage ceremony. M. RICHMOND & F. HALL, MARRIAGE AND THE STATE (1929).
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Marriage was the "voluntary union of one man and one woman for life
to the exclusion of all others." 9 This view was appropriate to the
Christian state, in essence, because it was the view of the Christian
Churches.
In the area of regulation of the family in particular, the two sys-
tems of authority were often seen as cooperative and connected. The
comments of the nineteenth century church historian Philip Schaff may
be taken as illustrative and exemplary. Schaff offered an explicit dis-
cussion of marriage as an area within the overlapping jurisdiction of
church and state. In 1888, Schaff noted that [despite the disestablish-
ment of churches in America] a total separation of Church and State
was impossible, and that monogamy, the Christian Sabbath and the
public schools were the "three interests and institutions which belong to
both church and state" and which had to be "maintained and regulated
by both." These were as he saw it, "connecting links between church
and state." As to divorce, Schaff noted that since some of the states
were too liberal on the question, a "reform of legislation in conformity
to the law of Christ [was] highly necessary for the safety and prosper-
ity of the family." As to monogamy, Schaff wrote that this form of
marriage was "according to the unanimous sentiment of all Christian
nations" the "one normal and legitimate form of marriage."40 The con-
sequences for the "new Mohammedanism of the Mormons" were obvi-
ous. In both the contexts of polygamy and divorce, the churches were
not merely saying that the state should enforce morality in general,
they were insisting more pointedly on a consonance between the state
law and the Christian law of marriage as they saw it reflected in the
New Testament.
The story of the Mormons and the story of divorce reform will be
used here to illustrate Modes I and II in practice.4' One narrative of
the Mormon encounters with the American legal system over the issue
of polygamy begins in 1852, when the Mormons announced publicly
39 Hyde v. Hyde, I L.R.P. & D. 130, 133 (1866). The case involved a Mormon apostate. See
Cannon, A Strange Encounter: The English Courts and Mormon Polygamy 22(l) B.Y.U. STUDS.
3 (1982).
4" p. SCHAFF, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 69 (1888 & reprint 1972). Impos-
sible "unless we cease to be a Christian people." Id.
"' The Mormons litigated a free exercise problem, and asked for an exemption from the law.
This would be a dominantly Mode 11 objective using Mode I as a means to that end, and it is, in
effect, the general view of the Mormon cases. Emphasis can be placed on another Mode I aspect
of the Reynolds case, the insistence of other religious groups that the state should enforce the
Christian law of marriage on a universal basis.
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that they were practicing plural marriage, and ends in 1890 when the
triumph of the federal government was formally acknowledged by the
Mormon Church. A critical moment in the narrative occurred in 1879,
when the Supreme Court in Reynolds v. United States4a passed on the
constitutionality of the 1862 Morrill antibigamy act, the first of several
federal statutes directed against the Mormon marital institution. The
Morrill Act provided that bigamy in the territories was a crime, pun-
ishable by fines and imprisonment. The constitutionality of the statute
was challenged in the courts by George Reynolds, secretary to Brigham
Young. Reynold's defense was that the First Amendment to the federal
constitution protected the Mormon right to religiously-based polygamy.
The use of such a claim by a deviant religious group may itself be
worth noting, because it is not to be assumed that religious groups will
feel free under their own rules to invoke rights under the state sys-
tem. 4' But the Mormons' sense that they were also a part of the larger
42 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). The Court's opinion was authored by
Chief Justice Waite. John Noonan has suggested that Waite "sounded precisely like his contem-
porary, Pope Leo XIII." Noonan, The Family and the Supreme Court, 23 CATH. UL. REV. 255
(1973). The link to Christianity is explicit in later Mormon cases.
"The organization of a community for the spread and practice of polygamy is, in a measure a
return to barbarism. It is contrary to the spirit of Christianity and of the civilization which Chris-
tianity has produced in the Western World .... The language itself is from: Corporation of the
Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1 (1889).
Significantly, in a sentence which includes a paraphrase of this language, C. ZOLLMANN,
AMERICAN CHURCH LAW 41 (1933) cites the Reynolds case.
See also Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 341-42 (1980), where the Court states that
"[b]igamy and polygamy are crimes by the laws of all civilized and Christian countries ...."
Justice Field was not even willing to call the advocacy of polygamy "a tenet of religion." Id. J.S.
Mill suggested that one of the offenses of the polygamous Mormons was that they claimed to be a
kind of Christian. Mill, On Liberty, in J. MILL, THREE ESSAYS: ON LIBERTY, REPRESENTATIVE
GOVERNMENT, THE SUBJUGATION OF WOMEN 112-13 (1859 & reprint 1975).
See generally Linford, The Mormons and the Law: The Polygamy Cases-Part 1, 9 UTAH L.
REv. 308 (1964); Linford, The Mormons and the Law: The Polygamy Cases-Part II, 9 UTAH L.
REV. 543 (1965). For the Mormon view of the Constitution as inspired, see W. NELSON, THE
CHARTER OF LIBERTIES: THE INSPIRED DESIGN AND PROPHETIC DESTINY OF THE CONSTITUTION
(1987).
In J. DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 9 (1965), the author noted that monogamy got
into the law because it was Christian and stayed there because it became part of the social struc-
ture. From this viewpoint, one could see Reynolds as a situation in which churches attempted to
persuade the state to adopt monogamy as a norm (Mode I), while the state responded in terms of
an identical rule understood in secular terms. (Who decides if this was a "successful" Mode I
strategy?)
40 That this concern has not been limited to marginal religious groups seems clear. Even
Theodore Woolsey, in discussing rights in his work, I POLITICAL SCIENCE (1878), felt it necessary
to treat the question of the tension between rights and Christianity. It has "sometimes been repre-
sented that there is opposition between the system of rights and the spirit of Christianity. The one
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system was revealed not only by their use of test case litigation as a
defense strategy but also by their repeated applications for statehood.
The Mormon argument in litigation was not, of course, that the nation
as a whole must become polygamous. It was simply that they had a
right under the rules of the state system to practice their religion as
they understood it.
In the Reynolds case, the claim of the group for an exemption was
rejected in principle. The Court said that "the statute immediately
under consideration [the antibigamy statute] is within the legislative
power of Congress"." This being so, the only question that remained
was, "whether those who make polygamy a part of their religion are
excepted from the operation of the statute."45 This idea had to be re-
jected because it "would be introducing a new element into criminal
law." In short, the law provided that plural marriages would not be
allowed, and the law applied to everyone. "Can a man excuse his prac-
tices to the contrary because of his religious belief?" Justice Waite
asked. "To do this would be to make the professed doctrines of reli-
gious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit
every citizen to become a law unto himself. Government could exist
only in name under such circumstances."' 6
is self-assertion, self-defense, the very spirit of selfishness; the other is self-renunciation, self-de-
nial, giving way to others." Id. at 30. Conceding that the "two differ in their nature," Woolsey
insisted that rights and Christianity were neither "antagonistic, nor mutually destructive." And a
waiver of rights in the spirit of Christian self-renunciation means that one has rights to waive. (He
also discussed "rights" and "honor.") One limit on the effective "rights" of religious groups is,
therefore, self-imposed. Id. at 30-31.
" Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166.
45 Id.
" Id. at 166-67. A similar claim, though with a different response from the Supreme Court,
was urged by the Amish in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), nearly one hundred years
later. Here, the issue arose largely because of the expanded role of the state in relation to commu-
nities that are essentially separatist. Whatever one concludes as to the historical motivations of the
compulsory education laws (see Tyack, Ways of Seeing: An Essay on the History of Compulsory
Schooling, 46 HARV. ED. REv. 355 (1976) on the various understandings of this point), it seems
clear that in relation to small communities, the law precipitated a crisis that took its shape from
the active enforcement of compulsory education laws. The Amish sought an exemption from the
compulsory education law of the state of Wisconsin. In this instance, the Court accepted the
argument based on the right of the Amish to the free exercise of their religion. The tension, in
law, between the two cases is obvious. And it is more than saying that the difference lies in a
difference in the groups themselves or the state's perception of the groups. (Though here, it could
be noted that while the Mormons were a large, growing group and widely perceived as a menace,
the Amish were small, self-contained and understood as benign.) A major difference in the two
cases lies in the state's understanding of the free exercise "right" itself. For the Reynolds Court,
there would be no right to be exempt from the general secular law. For the Yoder Court, there
could be, in the appropriate circumstances. For present purposes, the Mormon story and the
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The Reynolds case is illustrative of both Modes I and II. The
Mormons sought (unsuccessfully) an exemption from the state mar-
riage law. This is a Mode II objective. The Mormons were invoking,
however, a Mode I recognition of the rights claimed under federal law.
This recognition was withheld by the Court on the basis of a Mode I
understanding of the relations between Christianity and the state law
of marriage. "Marriage," Chief Justice Waite said, "while from its
very nature a sacred obligation, is nevertheless in most civilized nations
a civil contract, and usually regulated by law. Upon it society may be
said to be built, and out of its fruits spring social obligations and du-
ties, with which government is necessarily required to deal."' 7 If one
emphasis in that familiar sentence is the "civil contract," another
surely is the "sacred obligation." Marriage in America was to be ordi-
nary Christian monogamy.
It should be noted that the Mormon rights claim was not the only
one evident in the controversies over marriage. If the Mormons claimed
a federal right to control marriage in Utah and a federal constitutional
right to an exemption from compulsory monogamy imposed by the fed-
eral government, others claimed a general right to participate in the
framing of a national standard on the issue."' In short, rights con-
sciousness can also be illustrated not only by the Mormon litigation
under the free exercise clause, but also by the assertion by adherents of
other religions that as citizens with the right to participate fully in the
American political process-a right that in some cases had to be won
over time 4'-members of religious groups had a right to participate in
the framing of the standard to be applied universally. This aspect of
the use of a rights claim by religious groups is most clearly visible in
the controversies over divorce reform. A report to the Presbyterian
Amish story are both examples of Mode I1 attempts by religious groups to maintain their own
institutions within a larger structure, without asking that structure to adopt the institution as a
universal norm. In the Mormon case, the state's response was in large part based on the state's
understanding of itself as part of a whole that included the majority Christian community com-
mitted to monogamy. By the time of Yoder, the state understood itself as primarily secular, an
arbiter of the rights of internal groups that included religious groups like the Amish.
The issue of the state's regulation of private schools involves related questions. See R. MC-
CARTHY, D. OPPEWAL, W. PETERSON & G. SPYKMAN, SOCIETY, STATE, & SCHOOLS: A CASE FOR
STRUCTURAL AND CONFESSIONAL PLURALISM (1981).
" Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 165.
" For a discussion of women's "rights" claims in relation to this issue, see Minow, Under-
neath Everything That Grows, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 819 (1986). Note also the alternative views of
morality urged by women's arguments favoring freer divorce.
, See M. BORDEN, JEWS, TURKS AND INFIDELS (1984).
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General Assembly of 1905 illustrates the point:
Regarding the relations of the Church to the State . . . [t]he inter-church
conference [on marriage and divorce] has made decided advancement. It as-
sumes no authority, but does claim the right for its members, as citizens, to
protest against legislation, or lack of legislation, that defiles citizenship, and
that destroys the very foundations of society and righteous government."
But in this context also Modes I and II appear together. For ex-
ample, in his work, Divorce and Divorce Legislation, Theodore Wool-
sey offered two arguments. He said that although he would not argue
that the state had to do more than protect the legal rights of the church
("it goes actually beyond this to some extent"), still he thought that all
"who believe that Christian faith and morals are necessary for the well-
being of a State must feel that the purity of marriage demands every
protection."51 Woolsey also, however, made plain that a part of the ef-
fort to enforce a universal standard was based on the need to protect
the church itself, since the risk existed that the churches would them-
selves be corrupted by the looser state standard. The first argument
from the present perspective involves Mode I, while the second uses
Mode II.
Polygamy was legally defeated at roughly the same time that a
different large scale deviant pattern based on divorce and subsequent
remarriage-"serial" polygamy, as its opponents called it, 2 was be-
coming familiar. It is almost as though Mormon polygamy, the clear
case, the one on which everyone could agree, was handled with particu-
lar harshness exactly because the issue of divorce, equally an attack on
the basic conception of monogamous marriage for life, was a case on
which a widespread societal consensus no longer existed. But whether
or not one accepts this relationship between the two issues, another re-
lationship, a contrast, seems beyond dispute. While the forces of organ-
ized religion" would have counted their campaign against Mormon po-
lygamy a success, their campaign against lax divorce laws was, with a
o A. Calhoun, quoting the Report to Presbyterian General Assembly 308 (1905).
6 T. WOOLSEY, DIVORCE AND DIVORCE LEGISLATION 262 (1882). See generally O'NEILL,
DIVORCE IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 50 (1967); Friedman & Percival, Who Sues for Divorce?
From Fault Through Fiction to Freedom, 5 J. LEGAL STUD. 61 (1976).
:2 O'NEILL, supra note 51, at 50.
3 Obviously there were differences between Christian groups, particularly Catholic and Prot-
estant, that impacted on this problem. See Is Divorce Wrong? 149 N. AM. REV. 513-38 (1889) on
the debate over divorce and particularly the suggestion of the Catholic spokesman that the state
create an official (reminiscent of the Canon law "defender of the marriage bond") to appear on
the side of defendants in divorce actions.
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few exceptions, a failure. As the history of divorce since the 1950's
makes obvious, the effort represented by Woolsey and others in the
nineteenth and twentieth century54 was defeated in the political process
that resulted in no-fault divorce.
The history of this change parallels the history of the changes in
moral discourse in family law which Carl Schneider has recently de-
scribed. Quoting J.S. Mill on the relation between toleration and reli-
gious indifference, Schneider notes that with the "waning influence of
Christianity among the relatively affluent, educated elite" (and even
with the limited counter tendency represented by the growth of funda-
mentalist christianity) one sees that law has itself changed.
"[B]ecause religious views are less strongly held universally, statements
of moral aspirations linked to religion have slipped more readily from
legal discourse. 56 The moral decision, he suggests, has been delegated
to individuals. The decision of individuals to submit to other authorities
would be viewed as essentially contractual. By the mid-twentieth cen-
tury, the state, in short, did not view protection of specifically Christian
ideas of marriage as one of its functions. The Mode I strategy of
churches could no longer rely on the acknowledgment by the state of a
cooperative role in the enforcement of Christian morals.
B. Children
The history of marriage and divorce in America provides one illus-
tration of the state over time developing secular standards freed from
historic connections not only to Christian morals but particularly to the
Christian law of marriage. The law of child placement and adoption 57
similarly reveals the ways in which religious groups have used the state
system to obtain universal recognition of a particular religious interest
(Mode I used as a strategy to achieve a Mode II objective), and once
again, a twentieth century change in the state's position as to the Mode
I interaction. The new issue added in this context is the specific prob-
' For twentieth century arguments quite like Woolsey's, see 3 A. STOKES, CHURCH AND
STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 56-67 (1953).
6 See Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transformation of American Family Law, 83
MICH. L. REV. 1843, 1845 n.163 (1985).
I /d. at 1845.
The history of adoption in America has been described several times. See Presser, Histori-
cal Background of the American Law of Adoption, II J. FAM. L. 443 (1972)(on religious motiva-
tion of nineteenth century child welfare reformers); Zainaldin, Emergence of a Modern American
Family Law: Child Custody, Adoption, and the Courts, 1796-1851, 73 N.U.L. REV. 1038-89
(1979).
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lem of a group 8 as against individual59 rights claim.
Religious matching of children placed by the state in homes or in
institutions has to some degree been a characteristic of the American
legal system from an early period. But religious matching and religious
matching statutes do not seem to be best understood as a vestige of the
early religious establishments. Rather, some of the statutes were
adopted as a response by immigrant groups to problems they faced in
the American environment. Thus, in 1916, Lee Friedman noted in the
Harvard Law Review that "[i]n recent years, as the minority religious
groups have strengthened themselves they have more aggressively as-
serted a right to protect from proselytization the children of their faith
who come before the courts for disposition usually as dependent, delin-
quent, or neglected children."6 0
In fact, the issue went back some time. Writing in 1859, Orestes
Brownson indicated some of the grievances of nineteenth century
Catholics in America relating to the placement of children:
In our country although the Constitution and laws give no preference to any
doctrine or form of worship, public prejudice prevails to such a degree, that
the children of Catholics are very frequently withdrawn from their parents, if
poor and destitute, and placed under Protestant influence in public institu-
tions.... In most States, the magistrates can bind out such children, and in
some places, as in St. Louis, preachers are employed as paid agents, to enter
the houses of the poor, and snatch away their children in the name of the law.
Their names are sometimes changed, and they are soon sent away and bound
out far from the reach of their parents, whose natural rights are most unfeel-
ingly disregarded.6"
88 The problems of defining groups are beyond the scope of this paper, although state ap-
proaches to membership in religious groups for purposes of adoption are discussed briefly below.
88 Rights claims in the state system are associated with individuals. At the same time, there
is in law and elsewhere a new interest in community, groups, and association. See Karst, Paths to
Belonging: The Constitution and Cultural Identity, 64 N.C.L. REV. 357 (1986). See also Garet,
Communality and Existence: The Rights of Groups, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1001, 1002-03 (1983);
Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985).
* Friedman, The Parental Right to Control the Religious Education of a Child, 29 HARV.
L. REV. 485, 498 (1916). See generally Pfeffer Religion in the Upbringing of Children, 35 B.U.L.
REV. 333, 341 (1955).
Some of the controversy over religious upbringing of children relates to the enforceability (in
the state system) of contracts dealing with the issue.
81 The Mortara Case, 1859 BROWNSON'S Q. REV. 226, 230. Brownson was defending the
position of the Pope in relation to the taking, in the Papal states, of the Jewish boy Edgar
Mortara, who had been secretly baptized by a servant while ill. See generally B. KORN, AMERICAN
REACTION TO THE MORTARA CASE, 1858-1859 (1957).
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Similarly, Levi Silliman Ives wrote in 1857 of the problem of
Catholic children committed to private asylums run by Protestants. 2
Like Brownson, Ives referred to a constitutional mandate of the state to
ensure "the sacred rights of conscience," and claimed the protection of
this mandate.
The interreligious tension over children has been clear to histori-
ans. Billington called his chapter on school issues in New York (in The
Protestant Crusade) "Saving the Children for Protestantism."" s
O'Grady wrote that "The history of Catholic charities in the United
States is almost a history of the struggle of the immigrant for the pres-
ervation of the faith of his children." 64 This struggle involved legislative
and political activity. Statutes were adopted ranging from those that
gave a strong weight to religious matching, to those that simply in-
cluded religion among the possible factors, and, finally, those that
asked for matching "when practicable."'5 The statutory patterns could
reach not only adoption, custody, and guardianship, but even abroga-
tion of adoption. Thus, a New York statute authorized suits to abro-
gate an adoption because of any "attempt to change or the actual mak-
ing of a change or the failure to safeguard the religion of such child.","
Judicial response to the issue of the religious group presence in
individual adoption cases varied. In the 1907 Massachusetts case
"' Ives, Against Sectarianism Partisanship in Public Institutions, in AMERICAN CATHOLIC
THOUGHT ON SOCIAL QUESTIONS 90-100 (A. Abell ed. 1968). Abell noted that Protestants
proselyted Catholics with frenzied zeal from motives that were quite as much political
and social as religious. Not sure that any Catholic children could grow up to be good
citizens, the societies and missions, the better to isolate the destitute ones from the
Church's influence, scurried off thousands of them to Protestant homes in the West.
A. ABELL, AMERICAN CATHOLICISM AND SOCIAL ACTION: A SEARCH FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 20
(1960). The Letchworth Report makes plain that these institutions were founded in response to
the inadequacy (on religious grounds) of existing institutions. W. LETCHWORTH, HOMES FOR
HOMELESS CHILDREN (1903, reprint 1974). See also M. LANGSAM, CHILDREN WEST (1964).
63 R. BILLINGTON, THE PROTESTANT CRUSADE, 1800-1860 142 (1938). The reformers, while
often religiously oriented, did not necessarily feel committed to the family, either natural or rees-
tablished. See P. BOYER, URBAN MASSES AND THE MORAL ORDER (1978)(discussion of Charles
Loring Brace).
" J. O'GRADY, CATHOLIC CHARITIES IN THE UNITED STATES: HISTORY AND PROBLEMS 147
(1930).
" For a review of the statutes, see Note, Religion as a Factor in Adoption Guardianship,
and Custody, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 396-403 (1914). On constitutionality, see Sugarman v. Wilder,
385 F. Supp. 1013 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Dickens v. Ernesto, 30 N.Y.2d 61, 281 N.E.2d 153, 330
N.Y.S.2d 346, appeal dismissed, 407 U.S. 917 (1972). See also, Wilder v. Bernstein, 645 F.
Supp. 1292 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), affid, 848 F.2d 1338 (2d Cir. 1988); Wilder v. Bernstein, 449 F.
Supp. 980 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
66 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § l18(a)(repealed 1974).
1987-88]
JOURNAL OF FAMILY LAW
Purinton v. Jamrock,6 the lower court referred to the presence of reli-
gious groups, but rejected their right to a leading role in the proceed-
ings. The Roman Catholic Church and the Baptist Church were the
institutions involved. "If members of either church have taken an inter-
est in this case as sectarians and promoters of the interests of their
church, they have no proper place before the court and will receive no
recognition there." 68 (Other courts, sometimes in other contexts, have
viewed the role of the group, and the law of the group, more sympa-
thetically. " ) But a dominant role for sectarian placement agencies re-
mained obvious in the adoption process as a whole. Thus, a symposium
held in 1956 on adoption included separate papers on the attitudes to-
ward adoption of Protestant, Catholic and Jewish groups."0 At that
time it could still be said that "there was no area in adoption practice
that is more sensitive or more controversial" than the area concerning
the "religious heritage" of the child. The "principal question" con-
fronting agencies was this: "In which religion will a child be raised?"
In deciding this issue, "agencies are bound by law and judicial prece-
dents which in turn are products of the homes of the community and
the influence of religious groups that make up our population. ' 1 In the
1950s the possibility of religious groups using a state legislature as a
vehicle still remained clear: "If a particular group feels that within the
intellectual makeup of the men from which the judges in their commu-
nity are drawn there will not necessarily be found an appreciation of
the value of religious training similar to that which they may possess,
"972they should have recourse to the legislature ....
Although by the mid-1950s states often had statutes relating to
the issue, the critical point in practice was not the language of the stat-
ute but rather judicial interpretation and agency operations .7  As to
this, Monrad Paulson noted that "Religion is employed as a criterion in
adoption and child placement cases even where statutes are silent, as
17 Purinton v. Jamrock, 195 Mass. 187, 8 N.E. 802 (1907)
' Id. at 196.
" See, e.g., Ramon v. Ramon, 34 N.Y.S.2d 100 (Doam. Rel. Ct. 1942).
70 1 M. SCHAPIRO, A STUDY OF ADOPTION PRACTICE 58 (1956).
71 Id.
7' Note, Custody and Adoption of Children-Imposition of a Standard, 33 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 457, 462 (1958).
71 See, e.g., Broeder & Barrett, Impact of Religious Factors in Nebraska Adoptions, 38
NEB. L. REV. 641-91 (1959). On recent Catholic approaches, see I NEW CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPE-
DIA Adoption (U.S. Law oJ) 136 (1967). See also L. PFEFFER. CREEDS IN COMPETITION 127-31
(1958).
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agency personnel are likely to match children and prospective guardi-
ans on a religious basis."' 4 Writing in 1953, Leo Pfeffer suggested that
while the law spoke in terms of right, status was involved and that
judicial protection is sought not for the parent but for the religion.7 5 A
well-known case in the mid-1950s-Petition of Goldman-refused to
allow an inter-religious adoption even on facts indicating that the
mother had consented to the adoption.1 ' Clearly, some idea of a group
claim was involved.7
But, there has been an interesting change in the nature of the dis-
cussion over time. By the mid-1950s,78 the entire debate was seen to
raise difficult questions regarding the definitions of group member-
ship.79 The Goldman court did not "attempt to discuss the philosophy
14 M. PAULSEN, Constitutional Problems of Utilizing a Religious Factor in Adoptions and
Placement of Children, in THE WALL BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE (1963).
76 L. PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE AND FREEDOM 589 (1953).
76 Petitions of Goldman, 331 Mass. 647, 121 N.E.2d 843 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 942
(1955). The Goldman case involved twins born to a divorced Catholic mother, who had been
privately placed with a Jewish couple. A guardian ad litem urged that the adoption violated the
Massachusetts religious protection statute under which the twins, having the religion of their
mother, had to be placed when practicable with Catholic parents. Since Catholic parents were
available, the adoption was not permitted. The Goldmans left the state with the twins. (See L.
PFEFFER, CHURCH. STATE AND FREEDOM, 711-12 (1967).)
The twins here were not baptized. The precise issue of the Mortara case, as Orestes Brown-
son saw it (relating to the authority of the church over the baptized) was not involved. See Brown-
son, The Mortara Case, 1859 BROWNSON'S Q. REV. 226-46. In the Goldman case, unlike the
Mortara case, the religion of the natural parent (whether she was still a Catholic) was discussed.
' Both Pfeffer and Galanter suggest this. L. PFEFFER, supra note 76; Glanter, Religious
Freedoms in the United States: A Turning Point, 1966 Wis. L. REv. 217, 229 n.69.
76 That is, shortly after the end of the Second World War. Comment, A Reconsideration of
the Element in Adoption, 560 CORNELL L. REv. 780 (1971). Note that genocide is by definition
the violation of a group right.
7' For a recent discussion of group membership issues, see M. GALANTER, COMPETING
EQUALITIES; LAW AND THE BACKWARD CLASSES IN INDIA 305-26 (1984). See also B. BITTKER,
THE CASE FOR BLACK REPARATIONS (1975).
On the history of Sunday Closing Laws, see McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 484
(196 1)(Frankfurter J., concurring); for a review of who is entitled to exemptions from those laws,
see id. at 517.
Another context in which emphasis has shifted from groups to individuals is that of conscien-
tious objection to military service. The 1917 statute exempted anyone belonging to a "well-recog-
nized" religious sect or organization whose creed forbade members to participate in war in any
form and whose religious convictions were against war or participation in it ...." Selective Draft
Act, ch. 15, 40 Stat. 76 (1916). The 1940 act exempted those who by "religious training and
belief" were opposed to participation. Selective Training and Service Act, ch. 720, 54 Stat. 885
(1940). In 1948, exemption was defined so that religious training and belief meant "belief in
relation to a Supreme Being and not "essentially political, sociological or philosophical views or a
merely personal moral code .. " Military Selective Service Act, ch. 625, 62 Stat. 604 (1948).
Compare with religious adoption, issues of Indian adoptions. See In re Adoption of Halloway,
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underlying the concept that a child too young to understand any reli-
gion, even imperfectly, nevertheless, may have a religion." 80 But other
commentators on the dramatic litigation of the 1950s did treat this sort
of issue.8 By the mid-twentieth century, it was seen clearly that reli-
gious matching statutes require knowledge of the religion of the child
and that of the birth and adoptive parents, and thus require some way
of discovering what that religion is. It was understood that even for
religious groups, the religion of adults (let alone children) might be
difficult to determine. Problems of imputation of religion to children,8"
so called multiple dedication 3 and adult lapses" and commitments
were seen to be filled with complexity. Paul Ramsey's critical comment
on testimony to the effect that a child had been "born a Presbyte-
rian" 85-testimony that he said was fundamentally uninformed-raised
important issues of the limits of judicial competence. This perception,
whether understood as a constitutional limit or a general value of the
nation, was reinforced by the argument that group and status issues are
too difficult at too many levels for the American system to easily ac-
commodate.88 It seems that in this context within the state legal sys-
tem, the "group right," if any, had really been acknowledged and had
been incorporated in an individual right, and the state perceived itself
in the role of supreme authority over altogether private, individual and
732 P.2d 962 (Utah 1987)(adoption under the Indian Child Welfare Act).
80 Petitions of Goldman, 331 Mass. 647, 652, 121 N.E.2d 843, 846 (1954). See also In re
Adoption of E., 59 N.J. 36, 279 A.2d 785 (1971). A law review comment characterized the 1950
lawsuits as "cases that graphically demonstrated the basic disharmony between public temporal
concerns and religious considerations in the adoptive process." Comment, A Reconsideration of
the Religious Element in Adoption, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 780, 789 (1971).
81 See Ramsey, infra note 82.
82 Ramsey, The Legal Imputation of Religion to an Infant in Adoption Proceedings, 3
N.Y.U.L. REV. 649 (1959). See also Religion in Adoption and Custody Cases in I INSTITUTE OF
CHURCH AND STATE, CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 56-114 (1957).
18 Involved in the Mortara incident. See also In re Glavas, 203 Misc. 590, 121 N.Y.S.2d 12
(1953). Regarding "belief": does this standard raise the inquiry into actual belief in such a way
that a Catholic's "belief" may be Protestant for purpose of matching statute? See Religion and
Adoption, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 798 n.90 (1971).
" Petitions of Goldman, 331 Mass. 647, 121 N.E.2d 843 (1954).
88 Ramsey, The Legal Imputation of Religion, 34 N.Y.U.L. REV. 649, 654 (1959).
" See L. PFEFFER. CHURCH, STATE AND FREEDOM 709-10 (revised ed. 1967).
Then, too, there are the links to problems of prejudice and discrimination. Karl Llewellyn
addressed this by saying: "[W]e misconceive group prejudice when we think of it as primarily a
prejudice against some one or more particular groups .... It is instead at bottom a prejudice in
favor of 'My Own Group' as against all others, 'pro-us' prejudice eternal, live, and waiting, ready
to be focused and intensified against Any Other Group." K. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE 452-53
(1962)(emphasis added). Those political systems that have most effectively differentiated between
racial or religious groups may be those we least want to emulate.
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non-sovereign interests. Thus revised statutes tend to focus not on sta-
tus but on parental preference (contract) signals, if any, relating to re-
ligion. 87 While this can be explained on the basis of antagonism be-
tween ideas of religious status and ideas of separation of church and
state in the American legal context, it also has something to do with a
serious uncertainty about how issues of religious status are to be deter-
mined by secular courts. In this context, as is now true in the area of
constitutional interpretation itself, epistemological issues that were once
taken for granted have become, for the state legal system, very difficult.
Furthermore, as in the case of divorce, we see that something has
changed in the state's perception of relations between church and state.
A Mode I co-option of the state by the church must now be justified by
the state in entirely secular terms. From the state's point of view, reli-
gion in this context has come to be considered as part of a general best
interests test rather than as having an immensely significant indepen-
dent value. A point made in an English journal in 1951 is relevant
here: "It is perhaps a sign of the changing 'social philosophy' of our
day that religion is looked at only as an element of welfare." 88 The best
interest of the child may have some relation to membership in a reli-
gious group, but the group's "right" to its children is not a part of the
calculation. 9
The suggestion here as to the historical change relating to children
87 See discussion of New York law in Religion and Adoption, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 780, 791
nn.50-51.
" Religion and Custody, 95 SOLIc. J. 325 (1951).
" Compare the treatment of the return of the Dutch Jewish children in J. GOLDSTEIN, A.
FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 107-08, (1973) with the ap-
proach taken in Fishman, Jewish War Orphans in the Netherlands-The Guardianship Issue
1945-50, 27 THE WIENER LIBRARY BULLETIN 31-36 (1973-74). See also the amplifying statement
by Dr. Madzy Rood-de Boer, in the Dutch translation of BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHILD (DE TOVERFORMULE: IN HET BELANG VAN HET KIND)(1979)(global translation on file with
the Journal of Family Law).
When we consider the role of the sectarian adoption agency, however, the old pattern remains
at least theoretically visible. Thus, Sanford Katz, writing in 1962, described the position of Catho-
lic agencies as involving the idea that "any Catholic child being placed for adoption can have total
needs met only in a Catholic adoptive home." Katz, Judicial and Statutory Trends in the Law of
Adoption, 51 GEO. L.J. 64, 71 n. 26 (1962)(quoting Bowers, The Child's Heritage-From a Cath-
olic Point of View, in 2 A STUDY OF ADOPTION PRACTICES 130 (Schapiro ed. 1956)). He noted
also that the absence in the 1961 Model Adoption Act of a provision dealing with religious match-
ing, relates to the fact that all placements under the statute are to be agency-authorized. Deci-
sions regarding religious adoption would then be made at that level.
As a matter of state law, the question can be raised whether the use of religious criteria by
state-licensed adoption agencies would be unconstitutional. C. FOOTE, R. LEVY, & S. SANDERS,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW 309 (2d ed. 1976).
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and religion, and more broadly, religion and the family, is not about
the familiar though troublesome categories of public or private." Nor
is it about increases or decreases in state regulation. Arguments in
these categories often do not take into account that religion, as an au-
thority over the family, moved from the public (governmental) to the
private (nongovernmental) side over time. The state law of the family
in Colonial New England involved a strong religious value. The "priva-
tizing"' 1 of religion means that a source of authority above the family
that once was a coregulator of the family on the public side is now a
parallel regulator of the family on the private side. It is not obvious,
however, that regulation by churches results in a private (in the sense
of autonomously regulated) family. We would have to know much
more than we do about the historical patterns of the regulation of be-
havior by "private" groups to conclude anything on this point.
IV. CONSTITUTIONALISM AND PLURALISM
As Marc Galanter once noted, the field of church and state is the
"locus classicus of thinking about the multiplicity of normative or-
ders." '92 This paper has suggested that a pluralist analysis that posits
multiple authorities and then examines their interactions over time is
useful in dealing with the history of American family law and, more-
over, with the issue of religious authority in America's constitutional
structure,9 3 a structure that sees not merely "faction,"" but also multi-
ple authorities.
" See Teitelbaum, Family History and Family Law, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 1135-81.
" "The Modern Schism in America led to division along these lines; an outer, encompassing
culture existed independently of an inner, sequestered, largely ecclesiastical religious culture
within. It is possible to speak after these years of the privatizing of religion." M. MARTY, THE
MODERN SCHISM 98 (1970).
9" Galanter, Justice in Many Rooms: Courts, Private Ordering, and Indigenous Law, 19 J.
LEGAL PLURALISM 28 (1981).
" See Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1-40 (1934). For a
discussion of the Realist movement in a historical context, see E. PURCELL, CRISIS OF DEMO-
CRATIC THEORY (1973). Llewellyn's ideas on institutions were influenced by the work of Walton
Hamilton. See W. TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 93, 176-77 (1973);
5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, Institutions (1937).
Llewellyn's major work was in the field of commercial law. See Wiseman, The Limits of
Vision: Karl Liewellyn and the Merchant Rules, 100 HARV. L. REV. 465-545 (1987). In this
context also, Llewellyn was aware of group issues, and referred to the "vicious heritage" of view-
ing the parties to a deal as individuals. Llewellyn, What Price Contract?-An Essay in Perspec-
tive, 40 YALE L.J. 734 (1931).
" See FEDERALIST, No. 10. For a discussion of Madison and mediating institutions, see J.
ADAMS, VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS (1986).
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To elaborate this point, we must ask again the question raised by
Walton Hamilton on the occasion of the 150th anniversary of the
American Constitution. "What," he asked, "is the constitution?" '95 His
suggestions as to the answers were focused on contrasts between text
and interpretation, and between rules and realities. One implication of
Hamilton's ideas is that "constitutionalism" involves centrally not only
the text but also the working framework of the society, understood to
be "the constitution" itself, going beyond anything written down in a
constitutional text or state-sponsored code.9 Llewellyn, in 1934, saw
the "constitution as an institution." It was "an institution of major size,
[embracing] the interlocking ways and attitudes of different groups and
classes in the community-different ways and attitudes of different
groups and classes, but all coming together into a fairly well organized
whole."9
Today, as we have just marked the bicentennial of the American
Constitution, many of our questions build on these ideas. Today's ques-
tions, to the extent that they focus on text, deal with the possibility not
only of multiple meanings, but of multiple sources of meaning. The
"meanings" of the Constitution as offered by groups 8 other than the
state may be seen as entirely legitimate, as significant as the meaning
as offered by the state.
Various examples can be given of the ways in which the formal
state understandings of the constitution differ from other understand-
ings. Arthur S. Miller argued, for example, that America's living Con-
"' Hamilton, 1787 to 1937, Dr. in THE CONSTITUTION RECONSIDERED XV (Read ed. 1938).
What is The Constitution? "A writing set down on parchment in 1787 and some
twenty-one times amended? Or a gloss of interpretation many times the size of the
original page? Or a corpus of exposition with which the original text has been ob-
scured? Or 'the supreme law of the land'-whatever the United States Supreme Court
declares it to be? Or the voice of the people made articulate by a bench of judges? Or
an arsenal to be drawn upon for sanction as the occasion demands? Or a piling up of
the hearsay about its meaning in a long parade of precedents? Or a cluster of abiding
usages which hold government to its orbit and impose direction upon public policy? Or
a 'simple and obvious system of natural liberty' which even the national state must
honor and obey? And is the Constitution embossed on parchment, set down in the
United States Reports, or engraved in the folkways of a people? And last of all; has the
United States a written or an unwritten Constitution?"
Id. at XV-XVI.
(Hamilton, an economist on the law faculty at Yale, was the coauthor, with Douglas Adair,
of W. HAMILTON & D. ADAIR, THE POWER To GOVERN (1937).)
" Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, supra note 93, at 18-19.
97 Id. at 18.
08 However defined.
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stitution involved a "Corporate State" with corporations having author-
ity and power over the individual comparable to that of the political
state.99 Robert Cover noted that there was a significant difference be-
tween, for example, state and religious understandings of the free exer-
cise clause. Although from the state's view point, "the free exercise
clause's creation of small, dedicated, nomic refuges may appear to be
merely an (unimportant) accommodation to religious autonomy," for
religious groups like the Mennonites, "the clause is the axis on which
the wheel of history turns." 100 The state's view was, however, not to be
understood as the "real" meaning of the text. "[W]ithin the domain of
constitutional meaning, the understanding of the Mennonites assumes a
status equal (or superior) to that accorded to the understanding of the
Justices of the Supreme Court. In this realm of meaning-if not in the
domain of social control-the Mennonite community creates law as
fully as does the judge." Cover granted no "privileged character" to the
work of judges. He saw judges acting "in a world in which each of
many communities acts out its nomos and is prepared to resist the work
of the judges in many instances." '
Certainly this resistance is a possible outcome of the interactions
described here. When codes cannot be reconciled, choices between
codes will somehow be made.102 The interactive strategies outlined here
in the context of a discussion of family, church and state often, how-
ever, result in conflict avoidance. Further, since they involve shaping
11 A. MILLER, THE MODERN CORPORATE STATE (1976). On groups and law, see D. FUNK,
GROUP DYNAMIC LAW (1982).
Corporations have their own ideas about what family life should look like. See W. WHYTE,
THE ORGANIZATION MAN (1956); see also Lipson, Review, 66 YALE L.J. 1274 (1957)(a review of
Whyte referring to Chester Barnard's version of pluralist regulation in C. BARNARD, THE FUNC-
TIONS OF THE EXECUTIVE (1938)).
100 Cover, Forward: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 30 n.85 (1983); Cover, The
Folktales of Justice: Tales of Jurisdiction, 14 CAP. U.L. REV. 182 (1985).
The organized behavior of other groups and the commitments of actors within them
have as sound a claim to the word 'law' as does the behavior of state officials.
The most important consequence of this radical relativization of law is that vio-
lence-a special problem in the analysis of any community's commitments to its fu-
ture-must be viewed as problematic in much the same way whether it is being carried
out by order of a federal district judge, a mafioso or a corporate vice president.
Id. Cover described his position as "very close to a classical anarchist one-with anarchy under-
stood to mean the absence of rulers, not the absence of law." Id. at 181.
101 Id.
101 We are all hyphenated, as Laski wrote. Laski, The Personality of Associations, 29 HARV.
L. REV. 404 (1915). See also J. NEWMAN, A LETTER ADDRESSED TO HIS GRACE THE DUKE OF
NORFOLK ON THE OCCASION OF MR. GLADSTONE'S RECENT EXPOSTULATIONS (1875).
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the state structure to preserve groups that are not the state, these strat-
egies of decentralization are, it seems, closely related to the core politi-
cal ideas of American Federalism.
V. CONCLUSION
Most of our legal discussions of church and state view the issues
involved from the position of the state. Perhaps inevitably these discus-
sions tend to assume state sovereignty and to see churches among other
competing internal groups. This assertion of state sovereignty is fic-
tional,103 however, if understood to mean either that only the state
claims sovereignty or that this claim of the state to sovereignty is un-
qualifiedly and universally accepted. This paper has attempted to offer
a discussion of this issue not so much from the point of view of the
church as from the point of view of an observer of the interaction of the
several groups.
The paper began with the proposition that issues of church and
state are "constitutional" because there is something about them in our
documentary charter and because we understand them as touching the
largest issues of our social ordering. By contrast, issues relating to the
family, have often been conceived of by lawyers and others as relating
to private law and local law. 1 The internal aspects of the family have
sometimes been thought to be free of government regulation entirely.
But if one looks at the litigated cases and the greatest cases in the field
of church and state, it turns out that they often involve questions of the
family, children, schools and marriage. It is this overlap that leads to
the perspective outlined here. Issues commonly understood as small,
private, daily or familial turn out to touch the largest questions of reli-
gion and the state, and religious and secular authority.
Emphasizing groups rather than individuals, the paper developed a
distinction between the behavior of religious groups designed to co-opt
the state, and behavior designed to create space within the state for the
group's own regulation. An analysis of "rights" claims under state law
was offered which saw such claims in the context of the interactive
strategies. A historical change that focused on the state's response to
103 On fictions, see Soifer, Legal Fictions: Putting Words in Context, 20 GA. L. REV. 87 1
(1986).
' Note the domestic relations exception to the diversity jurisdictions of the federal courts.
On the current [state] understanding, see Developments in the Law: The Constitution and the
Family, 93 HARv. L. REV. 1156 (1980).
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the co-option (Mode I) strategy was outlined, and the suggestion was
offered that the change occurred well into the twentieth century.
The justification for the presentation as a whole was not, again, its
novelty. The ideas of English or legal pluralism are familiar. The
thought was that this well-known perspective is worth examining in the
context of current discussions of social and constitutional ordering. It is
a perspective that allows us to connect disparate historical phenomena
and, I suggest, permits us a better understanding of what is, or was, at
stake in certain church-state interactions and certain ways of talking
about rights, liberty and legal change.
